Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) say that they earn more from mail order generics than brands and that their interests are aligned with clients' interests. Wall Street and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) concur.
Introduction
The management of the drug benefit portion of healthcare plans has become the domain of contracted specialists called pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). The three largest, independent PBMs -Caremark Rx, Medco Health Solutions, and Express Scripts, (known as "The Big 3") --have come under attack in the past few years for not acting in the best interest of their clients.
The source of the problem is attributed to a business model that is dependent on rebates retained from brand name drug manufacturers.
PBMs say that they earn more from mail order generics than brands and that their interests are aligned with clients' interests. With few exceptions, Wall Street financial analysts that follow the Big 3 PBMs concur. Consider the following excerpt from a recent column in TheStreet.com that references comments by Merrill Lynch analyst Thomas Gallucci: 1 The overwhelming positive impact from generics for a PBM is in its mail-order business," wrote Gallucci, who lifted Medco's rating from neutral to buy. "A mail-order generic is the most profitable script a PBM can process."
Unlike his competitor at Goldman Sachs, however, Gallucci chose to focus on positive industry catalysts in this particular arena. Notably, he pointed out, a number of important brand-name drugs --including blockbusters such as Zocor and Zoloft --will lose their patents over the next two years. Moreover, he noted, those drugs are designed to treat chronic conditions and therefore "naturally lend themselves to being delivered via mail."
In the meantime, Gallucci illustrated how mail-order generics have benefited Medco already. He said that Medco generates up to four times as much profit on mail-order generics as it does on prescriptions in general and that in fact it relies on those mail-order drugs for more than half of its profits overall.
And here is another excerpt from TheStreet.com that references comments by SunTrust Robinson Humphrey analyst David MacDonald: 2 And it (Caremark) will be relying on the familiar, yet powerful, combination of mail-order sales and generic drug penetration to drive those quarterly results.
Indeed, Wall Street expects such favorable trends to steer the company (Caremark) --and, in fact, the entire PBM industry --toward an even rosier future.
"The company is well-positioned to capitalize on increasing prescription cost trends, a mix shift toward mailorder distribution, the aging of the baby boomers and its significant specialty distribution presence," SunTrust Robinson Humphrey analyst David MacDonald wrote late last month. "Combine that with the pending patent expirations of several blockbuster drugs, potential incremental growth from the Medicare drug benefit and strong free cash flow, and the fundamental outlook is bright."
In September of 2005, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a long awaited study of potential conflicts of interest by independent PBMs. 3 Congress had specifically requested that the FTC conduct this study in anticipation that PBMs would play a major role in the newly passed Medicare Modernization Act that extended outpatient drug benefits to Medicare recipients.
Like any good study of alleged wrongdoing, the FTC examined both motive and performance.
As to the question of motive, the FTC found that "…generic dispensing at own mail order pharmacies generally is more profitable than brand dispensing." (p.74) and concluded that the interests of independent PBMs are indeed aligned with their clients.
The analysis of both Wall Street and the FTC is flawed. Using the FTC's own data, we will show that the Big 3 PBMs during the study period of 2002-2003 stood to gain more at both the microdecision level and in the aggregate from brands than mail order generics.
The analysis of Wall Street and the FTC violated a basic principle of economics that decisions are "made at the margin." Potential conflict of interest arises only in situations involving "rebatable" brands and that rebate averages across all brands are significantly less that rebate averages across rebatable brands.
The analysis also failed to consider a basic principle of financial analysis that business segment profitability is due as much to transaction volume as average unit margin. It turns out that mail order generics are a relatively high average margin, but relatively low volume business for PBMs.
When these failures are corrected, the result is that PBMs earn more per rebatable transaction and in the aggregate from brand name drugs than mail order generics
To be fair, business model misalignment does not necessarily mean a misalignment of interests.
And, a motive for wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to wrongdoing itself. The FTC analysis seems to support the Big 3's contention, echoed by Wall Street, that their business model is oriented to benefit from any shift from brands to generics, either at micro-level of individual prescription switches or at the macro-level of drug trends.
Alignment of
The FTC analysis fails on two counts. When these failures are corrected, the result is that PBMs earn more per "rebatable" transaction and in the aggregate from brand name drugs than mail order generics. The current business models of the Big 3 PBMs are not aligned with clients'
interests.
One The FTC failed to understand how this variability might impact their analysis of PBM motivation.
Economic bargaining theory suggests that drug companies would pay the highest rates for top selling drugs under conditions of "bilateral oligopoly". That is, the highest rebates are paid for brand drugs in therapeutic classes where there are a few sellers and where there are a few large buyers capable of "moving markets" or at least present a credible threat to do so.
The fact that PBMs stop giving rebates once a therapeutic class faces competition from low-cost generics is consistent with bargaining theory. At the other extreme, it is to be expected that brand name drug manufacturers with monopoly positions would not feel compelled to offer rebates.
Market power on the sell side is also a factor that explains variability of rebates. For example, it is doubtful that substantial rebates are offered for central nervous system drugs such as anti-depressants and anticonvulsants even though there are a number of potential substitutes in each class. Drug companies realize that the threat of PBM action in these classes is reduced because
PBMs are hesitant to override physicians' decisions when there is such a variety of individual reaction to any given drug.
In addition, it is to be expected that rebates are generally higher on drugs for chronic illnesses such as high cholesterol than for drugs for acute illnesses such as infections. The reason has to do with the potential buy-side power to affect demand. PBMs rarely engage in concurrent therapeutic interchange, a key finding (p.84) reported by the FTC. If PBMs engage in any discretionary prescription switching among therapeutic equivalents, it is retrospective -or made on renewals. Because prescriptions treating acute illnesses are rarely renewed, PBMs ability to affect demand is limited. On the other hand, the potential of PBMs to affect the demand for drugs treating chronic illnesses is enormous because prescriptions are renewed over and over again.
Individual economic decisions are based on marginal, not average, consequences. The areas where PBM discretion matters most are concentrated in top selling classes of drugs treating chronic illnesses. Drugs in these classes are the most "rebatable" -facing both limited competition on the Pharma sell side and willingness, whether exercised or not, on the PBM buy side to affect demand through discretionary formulary design and compliance.
The FTC failed in its analysis when it used a broad average for rebates. represents an 11% discount -3% for wholesale margin and 8% for retail margin -from the FTC study supplied statistic of $78.26 (p.29) for the average ingredient price of an on-patent brand prescription filled through retail channels.
If the overall average of $ 6.34 were used to represent the rebate negotiating power of the Big 3, it would amount to a rebate percentage of only 9.0% of WAC.
This difference highlights the weakness of using broad averages as a measure of rebate negotiating power. It also highlights the weakness of using broad averages when comparing the rebate negotiation power of the private sector with the rebate negotiating power of the Federal government as measured by the Medicaid "best price" rebate rate. While the results seem straightforward, caution must be exercised in drawing any conclusions due to the fact that the Big 3 employ a bundle pricing strategy with all sorts of cross-subsidies.
PBMs have found it advantageous in contract negotiations to price services like mail order and claims processing low while recouping margin deficiencies through secretive rebate retention.
We have analyzed this strategy in another paper. It is obvious that macro drug trends that favor generics are in the best interest of plan sponsors.
The Big 3 PBMs suggest that such trends are also in their own best interests. Wall Street analysts have echoed this sentiment. But, this is incorrect.
It has been widely reported that in 2006 there will be an unusually large number of blockbuster drugs losing patent protection, including Zocor, the drug with the 2 nd highest sales. Wall Street financial analysts believe that such events will help, rather than hurt, PBM profitability. But, this conclusion is based only on a consideration of average unit spreads. The reality is that the replacement of the Zocor by its relatively higher generic, simvastatin, benefits a PBM business segment representing only 13.7% of total volume.
Business Model Differences: Medco vs. Express Scripts
Until recently, none of the Big 3 PBMs disclosed any detail about the share of gross profits ,000, and $810,393,000, respectively. Cost of revenues has been reduced by the same amounts. These amounts represent the gross amount of rebates and administrative fees received from pharmaceutical manufacturers. Our client's portion, a majority of such amounts, which represents in excess of 50%, will continue to be classified as a reduction of revenues. Our consolidated gross profit was not impacted as a result of this adoption.
The key statistic to understanding the PBM business model is what we have called the rebate retention rate -the percent of rebates from drug manufacturers that it retained as gross profits. 7 Based on the Express Scripts disclosure, we were able to estimate with some degree of confidence that in 2002, its rebate retention rate was 38% and that retained rebates contributed to 35% to its gross profits.
On October 28, 2004, Medco Health Solutions, Inc. first disclosed that its rebate retention rate was 40.5% of $754 Million in gross rebates received from pharmaceutical manufacturers during the 3 rd quarter of 2004. 8 Based on that disclosure, it is possible to derive with certainty that 71.7% of Medco's gross profits in 3 rd quarter of 2004 came from retained rebates.
The Rebate Bargain as a Source of Business Model Differences
Even though these two PBMs had similar rebate retention rates, the contribution of rebates to gross profits was significantly different. Exhibit 5 presents key statistics that summarize the business model differences of Express Scripts and Medco. The full derivation of these statistics has been presented in previous papers. 9 10 The summary The other reason is that it is likely that Pharma gave more rebates to Medco because Medco gave more to Pharma in terms of favorable formulary designs and compliance. Pharma gave Express Scripts less rebates because Express Scripts gave less in return.
Prior work tends to rule out differences in approach to the design of national formularies as a source. We found in an earlier paper no significant differences among the Big 3 in the number of brands given "Tier 2" preference in highly rebatable therapeutic classes. It is unlikely that data would ever be available to shed light on differences in approaches taken by PBMs in the areas of retrospective therapeutic interchange. We have to look for performance differences as indicative of differences in approaches. The aggregate generic dispensing rate is a measure of PBM performance that can be viewed as reflecting how motivated a PBM is in favoring generics over brands To be fair, plan sponsor and their members' "taste" for freedom of choice also may be an important factor in explaining differences in dispensing rates.
The generic dispensing rate is the number of generic prescriptions divided by the number of all prescriptions. The graph below tracks this rate for Medco (MHS), Caremark RX (CMX), and Express Scripts (ESRX) over the past two and a half years. 13 The data show clearly that Express Scripts has delivered a consistently higher rate than the other two PBMs. And, according to Express Scripts, every percentage point increase in the rate translates into one percentage point decrease in overall plan drug costs. Express Scripts recently completed a study of the potential savings that could be obtained if all potential brand to generic therapeutic interchange were realized. This is from their press release announcing the results of the study: 15 We have only scratched the surface in taking advantage of the money-saving potential of clinically sound generic drugs," said Steve Miller, MD, Express Scripts Vice President, Research, and a study author. "As additional generics come to market and the use of prescription drugs grows, the opportunity to lower healthcare costs becomes even more significant. Best of all, using more generics simply requires better education and awareness of alternatives, not a big-dollar up-front investment."
Big 3 PBMs Generic Dispensing Rate
Exhibit 6 summarizes Express Scripts' estimate of the potential for cost-saving switches to generics. Express Scripts' second announcement outlined its plan to handle the loss of patent protection by
Zocor, an anti-cholesterol drug. 16 Zocor ranks second in drug sales after its archrival, Lipitor. It is also one of the top three rebatable drugs along with Lipitor and Nexium. Express Scripts announced that it would aggressively work to switch users from Lipitor to Zocor a full six month before generic Zocor -simvastatin -would be available. The plan included removing Lipitor from preferred status on Express Scripts' national formulary and directing its call center personnel to begin calling physicians to request prescription switches. As expected, Pfizer, the manufacturer of Lipitor, immediately canceled its rebate contract with Express Scripts.
Switching users to Zocor now will make the switch to simvastatin go faster in six months because generic substitution -Zocor to simvastatin -can be done automatically without physician approval. On the other hand, therapeutic interchange -Lipitor to simvastatin -requires physician approval.
This aggressive move to sacrifice current profits for future client cost savings is indicative of a difference in orientation between Express Scripts and Medco.
Bundle Pricing Strategy as a Source of Business Model Differences
Medco has used it ability to extract rebates from Pharma, coupled with secrecy surrounding it rebate retention rate, to win contracts through low bids on mail order and claims processing. It recoups service margin deficiencies though rebate retention. The epitome of Medco's strategy was its bid on the mail order only contract for the FEHBP, which we believe was a case of predatory pricing.
17
Exhibit 4 highlights the significant differences between Medco and Express Scripts with respect to the share of gross profits contributed by rebates, mail order, and claim processing fees. Express
Scripts has the more balanced business model whereas Medco has been heavily dependent on rebates.
While business models of the Big 3 in general are not aligned with clients' interests, Medco stands out as the PBM that has most pursued rebates and employed a deceptive bundle pricing strategy to win contracts. And it is Medco that will have to change the most to meet client requests for a more transparent business model characterized by 100% pass-through of rebates.
Medco's lagging generic dispensing rate is circumstantial evidence of its relative lack of interest in pursuing brand to generic therapeutic interchange.
If any PBM is committing "sins of omission", it is Medco.
